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Abstract 
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions.   
These executives obtain wealth increases with a median of $4 to $5 million and a mean of $8 to 
$11 million, roughly in line with the permanent income streams that they sacrifice.  CEOs 
receive lower financial gains from those transactions in which they become executives of the 
buyer, suggesting that tradeoffs exist between the financial and career-related benefits they 
extract.  Regression estimates suggest that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premia in 
transactions that involve extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO. 
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What’s In It For Me? 
Personal Benefits Obtained by CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Negotiations in mergers and acquisitions often hinge on “social issues” involving top 
managers.  Self-interested executives bargain not only over the price to be paid to target 
shareholders, but also over such items as who will occupy the CEO position in the merged 
company, who will sit on the board of directors, the location of headquarters, whether the 
company name will change, and especially, executive compensation.  The news media has 
reported the collapse of numerous high-profile merger discussions because of managers’ inability 
to reach compromises over these private benefits, indicating that severe agency problems can 
prevent economically beneficial transactions from occurring.1  Further stories have reported 
elaborate, lucrative packages of personal benefits negotiated by target CEOs as conditions for 
agreeing to their firms’ acquisition.2 
                                                 
1 Salpukis (1999) describes how the proposed acquisition of Texaco Inc. by Chevron Corp. fell through because 
Chevron’s CEO “was not willing to share power with” his Texaco counterpart.  Burton and Tanouye (1998) discuss the 
failure of the merger of American Home Products Corp. and Monsanto Co. due to managerial disagreements that “ranged 
from who should be assigned to corporate headquarters to compensation for top executives.”  The announcement of this 
deal’s collapse caused a one-day $14 billion decline in the companies’ joint market capitalization.  Lipin (1996) provides 
several additional examples. 
2 For example, Hechinger (1999) reports that as part of his company’s merger agreement with Fleet Financial 
Group, the CEO of BankBoston Corp. extracted a promise that he would become CEO of the buyer at the end of 2001 
unless 80 percent of the board objected at that time to his appointment.  If so, the company would be required to pay $15 
million to the CEO’s charitable foundation. 
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The notion that executives extract private benefits from managing the firm is common in 
the corporate finance literature.  Many theoretical papers use private benefits of control as a 
modeling assumption; for two recent examples, see Fluck (1999) and Berkovitch and Israel 
(1996).  These private benefits can cause agency problems that reduce the value of the firm, and 
the market for corporate control provides a vital mechanism for mitigating these problems.  The 
takeover market of the 1980s featured a high incidence of hostile acquisitions characterized as 
discipline of incumbent management (see, e.g., Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988).  In contrast, 
regulatory changes in the market for corporate control caused the 1990s to have few hostile 
acquisitions, as shown by Schwert (2000).  Given the diminished disciplinary power of the 
takeover market, we investigate the question: If managers obtain private benefits of control, 
under what circumstances will they surrender them in a friendly merger? 
We study a sample of several hundred completed U.S. acquisitions in the late 1990s, 
documenting the benefits, financial and otherwise, received from the transactions by the CEOs of 
the target companies.  We collect information on such variables as stock and option appreciation, 
golden parachute payments, additional cash payments made because of the transaction, the 
CEO’s position in the new firm, and the composition of the new board of directors.  For those 
executives that remain involved with the acquiror as either an officer or director, we track their 
change in executive compensation and their position for three years following the transaction. 
We expect that target CEOs will attempt to extract large benefits from merger 
transactions to compensate for the losses of compensation, power, and prestige that occur when 
they agree to sell their companies.  These benefits might take the form of either increased 
financial wealth or attractive positions in the management team of the buyer.  In addition, we 
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expect that CEOs might be willing to compromise the interests of their own shareholders in 
pursuit of these benefits, possibly negotiating less favorable acquisition terms in those deals in 
which they personally fare well. 
Our empirical results provide benchmarks with which to measure the gains obtained by 
target CEOs whose firms are acquired, while also providing some evidence of agency problems 
arising in the negotiation of mergers and acquisitions.  The CEOs in our sample obtain total 
financial gains with a median value of approximately $4 to $5 million and a mean of $8 to $11 
million.  While the distribution exhibits an upper tail that includes truly large windfalls for some 
target CEOs, for most executives these monetary benefits appear roughly in line with the 
permanent income streams that they lose from the disappearance of their prior jobs. 
We find that CEOs receive lower financial benefits in those transactions in which they 
become executives of the buyer, suggesting that tradeoffs exist between the financial and 
employment benefits that selling CEOs extract from the sale of their firms.  However, these 
career-related gains may be largely illusory.  While slightly more than half of the target CEOs 
accept managerial positions in the buyer, but only a small minority take leadership posts such as 
CEO or chief operating officer.  Job security is quite low for these former CEOs, with post-
merger turnover rates in the neighborhood of 20% to 30% annually. 
Finally, we present regression estimates that provide some evidence indicating that target 
CEOs negotiate lower acquisition premia for their own shareholders in transactions that involve 
extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO.  These transactions are characterized by special 
payments to the CEO at the time of the merger, as well as high-ranking managerial posts in the 
buyer and membership on the buyer’s board of directors. 
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Our study complements the previous literature in two ways.  First, by analyzing 
completed mergers we examine managerial incentives at a later stage of the acquisition process 
than in most prior papers, which have generally focused on the probability of firms becoming 
targets and the likelihood of managerial resistance to offers.  Second, where the previous work 
often characterized the conditions under which management was forced to give up control, we 
use a more recent sample to determine the circumstances under which management voluntarily 
agrees to forego the benefits of control. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews related 
literature about managerial characteristics and corporate control activity.  Section 3 describes our 
sample selection and data gathering.  Section 4 analyzes the gains received by target CEOs as a 
result of the acquisitions.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
Our investigation of the benefits received by target CEOs in completed mergers 
complements a previous literature studying managerial incentives in corporate control activity.  
Much of the prior literature documents target management's ability at various stages of the 
acquisition process to take actions in their own interests rather than those of shareholders.  For 
example, a firm's attractiveness as a takeover candidate may be decreasing in managerial 
ownership, due to management's reluctance to give up their positions or control of the firm (e.g., 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1989).  Conditional on receiving an offer, managers may resist the 
proposed combination in order to protect their personal benefits at the expense of shareholders' 
wealth (e.g., Cotter and Zenner, 1994). 
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  Personal stock ownership represents one clear source of potential variation in target 
managers’ attitudes toward selling their firms.  Stulz (1988) argues that higher managerial 
ownership results in two competing effects.  First, firms with higher ownership are less likely to 
be subject to an acquisition attempt due to the CEO’s voting control.  Second, conditional on an 
attempt being made, firms with higher managerial ownership are expected to receive a higher 
price due to the CEO’s bargaining power. Empirical evidence has been largely consistent with 
these implications.  For example, Song and Walkling (1993) find that acquisition targets have 
lower ownership than their industry's average, or corresponding matching firms.  For attempts 
that are eventually successful, managerial ownership is positively related to abnormal returns on 
the target's stock over the period from announcement through outcome.  Mikkelson and Partch 
(1989) find no relation between the likelihood of a successful acquisition and management's 
control of the target.  This lack of a relation, however, is due to two offsetting effects.  The 
probability of receiving a takeover offer is decreasing in management ownership, but the 
probability that an offer (if made) leads to a change in control increases with management 
ownership. 
Related work has documented relations between variables other than management 
ownership and the likelihood of takeovers and acquisitions.  For example, Shivdasani (1993) 
argues that the board of directors acts as a substitute mechanism for corporate control, while 
unaffiliated blockholding acts as a complementary mechanism.  He finds that the likelihood of a 
hostile takeover attempt is decreasing (increasing) in the ownership stake of the outside directors 
(affiliated blockholders).  Aside from governance and incentive variables, many studies have 
shown a relation between firm performance and the likelihood of being an acquisition target 
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(e.g., Palepu, 1986). 
Once an offer has been made, management's response depends on the incentive 
mechanisms in place.  Cotter and Zenner (1994) and Walkling and Long (1984) argue that 
management's resistance to tender offers appears driven by concern over its own interests rather 
than those of shareholders.  Both studies document that management resistance is negatively 
related to the change in managerial wealth, an effect attributed by the former study to the change 
in wealth due to managerial share ownership.  Further, Cotter and Zenner (1994) show that 
management gains on average from resisting tender offers (while shareholders do not), and that 
the probability of a successful offer is increasing in the change in managerial wealth. 
Hadlock, Houston and Ryngaert (1999) argue that managers' incentive to act in their own 
interests also affects the likelihood of being acquired.  They show that for a sample of bank 
acquisitions, banks with higher ownership are less likely to be acquired.  This result is especially 
strong for observations where the target managers leave the firm following the acquisition.  They 
interpret the results as consistent with the hypothesis that the degree of managerial entrenchment 
is an important determinant of the probability that a bank is acquired. 
Hadlock at al. (1999), Agrawal and Walkling (1994), and Martin and McConnell (1991) 
document high rates of managerial turnover for target firms following corporate control activity.  
Hadlock et al. find that 53.6% of their sample's top executives leave the banking organizations 
within two years of the date the merger agreement is finalized.  Agrawal and Walkling (1994) 
calculate the retention and dismissal rates of CEOs for a set of firms receiving takeover bids.  
They find that only 45% of the target CEOs are retained one year after the bid.  Successful bids 
result in even larger departure rates; for this subsample, 65% of the CEOs are not employed as 
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senior executives in any public corporation one year after the bid.  Martin and McConnell focus 
on turnover of top managers of targets of successful tender offers.  They find a turnover rate of 
41.9% for the target's top manager in the year following the takeover, and 19% during the second 
post-turnover year.  They classify takeovers in which the target's top executive leaves the firm as 
disciplinary.   They then show that disciplinary takeovers are associated with poor performance 
by the target prior to the tender offer, while non-disciplinary takeovers are not.  Additionally, 
gains to both bidders and targets are independent of the type of takeover (disciplinary or non-
disciplinary). 
Agrawal and Walkling (1994) and Harford (2000) consider the effects of takeover bids on 
management and directors in terms of Fama’s (1980) notion of  “ex post settling up.”  Agrawal 
and Walkling consider the effects of takeover bids on target-firm CEOs from 1980 to 1986.  
Consistent with ex post settling up, they find that post-bid changes in compensation are 
negatively related to pre-bid abnormal compensation.  They interpret this as consistent with the 
view that the labor market uses information produced by the takeover process to discipline 
managers.  Harford finds evidence consistent with directors also experiencing ex post settling up 
following takeover bids occurring from 1988 through 1991.  He shows that outside directors 
generally fare worse (financially) than inside directors following the bid, and the outcome is 
related to both pre-bid performance and the target’s reception of the offer.  Specifically, outside 
directors of poorly-performing firms fare worse in the directorial labor market, especially if the 
target rebuffs the offer.  If the firm accepts the offer, the directors’ losses are mitigated. 
Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) connect the nature of the transaction to its purpose, 
arguing that disciplinary takeovers typically appear to be hostile in nature, while mergers for 
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synergistic reasons tend to be friendly.  They find that characteristics other than financial 
incentives of target managers differ across these two types of deals.  Segmenting acquisitions 
into friendly and hostile, they document a relation between managerial ownership and the type of 
acquisition.  Compared to hostile mergers, friendly acquisitions are associated with greater stock 
ownership by directors and officers, and increased incidence of founding family members 
managing the target firm.  Large managerial ownership appears to encourage friendly 
acquisitions, but not significantly discourage hostile ones.  The performance of friendly targets is 
basically indistinguishable from that of non-targets in their sample, while hostile-takeover targets 
are associated with poor relative performance. Mørck et al. (p. 104) interpret their evidence as 
"consistent with the view that hostile targets and friendly targets are very different types of 
companies." 
 
3. Sample selection and data description 
We analyze a sample of 311 transactions identified from the mergers and acquisitions 
database of Securities Data Company.  We begin with all completed U.S. mergers with 
announcement dates between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 1997.  We require that (i) both 
firms be publicly traded and listed on the Center for Research in Securities Prices database; (ii) 
both have market capitalizations exceeding $100 million four weeks prior to the announcement 
date; (iii) the buyer purchase at least 90 percent ownership of the target; and (iv) the ratio of the 
two firms’ market capitalizations lies within the range of 0.10 to 10.00, to rule out transactions 
with extreme size disparities.  These screens yield a candidate sample of 320 deals.  We drop 
eight observations in which the acquiror already held a dominant ownership position in the 
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target, and one transaction involving a Canadian firm that was not required to meet the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s filing requirements. 
We focus our data gathering on the remaining 311 target companies and their CEOs.  For 
each of these, we attempt to obtain information from three SEC filings: (i) the Proxy Statement, 
Form 10-K or similar document containing ownership and compensation data in advance of the 
last annual meeting before the acquisition announcement; (ii) the Proxy Statement, Form S-4, or 
other document (if any) filed in connection with the transaction; and (iii) the first Proxy 
Statement of the acquiring company filed after the merger becomes effective.  Our final sample 
for regression analysis includes information about 239 target CEOs, meaning that we have 
missing values for at least one variable for 72 out of 311 companies, or 23 percent.  The main 
sources of missing values are variables related to golden parachutes and related merger payments 
(missing for 39 CEOs), stock and option ownership data (missing for 26 CEOs), and cash 
compensation data (missing for 22 CEOs). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the CEOs in our sample companies.  The 
typical CEO is about 54 years old, with median stock and option ownership of 0.8 percent and 
1.1 percent of the company’s shares outstanding, respectively (mean values are slightly higher).  
The median salary + bonus cash compensation for CEOs in the year prior to the acquisition is 
about $521,000 (mean $798,000).  Many of the CEOs share power with at least one other top 
executive: in 30.5 percent of the firms someone else holds the title of chairman of the board, 
while in 28.5 of the sample some other executive serves as president of the company.  We are 
unable to calculate statistics about the tenure in office of many CEOs, since a significant 
proportion of the sample companies disclose only that their CEOs have served for more than five 
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years.  Our sample is almost equally split between CEOs who have served less than five years 
and five or more years. 
Information about our sample of transactions appears in Table 2.  The median target firm 
has market capitalization of $386 million (mean $1.28 billion), measured one month prior to the 
date of the first offer made by the buyer.  The ratio of the target’s market cap divided by the 
buyer’s has a median of 0.317 (mean of 0.442), indicating that some size disparity exists between 
the two companies in most of our transactions, but not to a severe extent.  Just 2.6 percent of our 
transactions begin with unsolicited bids, according to SDC.  We measure the takeover premium 
to target shareholders using information from both SDC and CRSP.  SDC reports a median 
premium of 30.4 percent (mean of 34.8 percent) over the four weeks prior to the transaction 
announcement.  This statistic assumes that the deal will ultimately close according to the terms 
announced in the merger agreement.  If the consideration paid to target shareholders is stock in 
the buyer, the SDC premium uses a pre-announcement value of the buyer’s stock price.  We 
calculate an alternative measure of the takeover premium from the CRSP database, measuring 
the stock’s run-up over the 20 days prior to the announcement, and we find lower premia with a 
median of 21.1 percent (mean of 22.7 percent).  These smaller gains in target equity value might 
capture a variety of effects, including a post-announcement decline in the buyer’s stock price, 
skepticism that the deal will be completed according to its announced terms, or the time value of 
money if the approval process is expected to be lengthy. 
 
4. Benefits received by target CEOs 
CEOs of acquired companies can potentially obtain benefits from a variety of sources, 
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both financial and otherwise.  Table 3 presents information about the wealth increases 
experienced by target CEOs as well as their post-merger role in the governance of the buyer 
company.  We estimate that CEOs earn a median of approximately $4 to $5 million in increased 
wealth (mean of $8 to $11 million) as a result of the acquisition, depending on whether we use 
the 20-day CRSP or four-week SDC premium as the basis for our calculations.  Maximum values 
run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.  Data in Table 3 indicate that for the median CEO, 
the total wealth gains equal roughly six to eight times annual cash compensation (10 to 15 times 
for the mean CEO).  In the context of the high rates of CEO departure described below, these 
wealth gains appear to represent a rough substitute for the present value of compensation the 
CEOs might have expected to receive if they had remained in their jobs until retirement, 
something that we explore further in regression analysis. 
 
4.1 Stock and option holdings 
The largest source of wealth increase comes from appreciation of the CEO’s direct 
stockholdings, which we calculate by multiplying the percentage acquisition premium by the 
CEO’s pre-announcement equity ownership value.  These calculations indicate a median CEO 
stock appreciation of slightly more than $1.3 million, with a much higher mean of about $4.2 
million. 
For appreciation of the CEO’s options, data limitations force us to calculate an upper 
bound; we assume that all options are at- or in-the-money prior to the transaction, and we 
multiply the raw dollar value premium per share by the number of options held.  This calculation 
assumes that all options are “cashed out” via forced exercise at the time of the transaction, which 
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is quite common practice according to our readings of SEC filings.  Our analysis shows median 
and mean option gains of about $230,000 and $656,000, respectively, only about one-sixth as 
large as the corresponding statistics for direct stock appreciation. 
 
4.2 Golden parachutes and related merger payments 
CEOs also obtain significant merger-related wealth increases from golden parachutes and 
similar payments.  Sixty-nine percent of the CEOs in our sample have golden parachute 
arrangements in place, according to the proxy statements filed in the year prior to the acquisition. 
 The typical structure of these incentive plans calls for a lump-sum payment equal to a multiple 
of the CEO’s salary and bonus prior to the deal (for tax reasons, this multiple equals three in a 
large number of cases).  We calculate the parachute payout to CEOs by applying the formula 
from each company’s golden parachute plan to the CEO’s cash salary and bonus in the year prior 
to the deal.3  Including the 31 percent of observations with zero parachute payments, CEOs 
receive a median of $900,000 (mean of $1.465 million) from this source. 
For a non-trivial fraction of the CEOs in our sample, 12.1 percent, the parachute 
payments are augmented by the target’s board of directors at the time that it approves the merger. 
 In these cases, boards vote to increase the CEO’s parachute value and shareholders learn of the 
                                                 
3 This calculation simplifies the data in two respects.  First, some parachute payouts are based on cash 
compensation not in the year prior to the transaction, but instead according to a more elaborate formula such as the 
maximum for the three years prior to the transaction.  The diversity of these approaches would make our calculations 
prohibitively complex, so we use the final year’s compensation to keep the analysis manageable.  Second, we make an 
assumption that all parachutes are actually triggered by the mergers and acquisitions in our sample.  This may not be 
strictly true if certain deals do not qualify as “changes in control” necessary to activate the parachutes.  However, we do 
not have enough information to make this determination conclusively for many transactions, and we observe that in a large 
number of SEC merger filings that companies go out of their way to resolve any ambiguity by stipulating that a change in 
control has occurred for purposes of golden parachute payments.  Our treatment of parachute payments in this way means 
that our estimates probably represent upper bound on the amount that CEOs actually obtain. 
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change after the fact from an SEC filing.  The mean value of the CEO wealth increase from this 
source is about $393,500; dividing this figure by the frequency of .121 indicates that when 
boards do vote to augment the CEO’s parachute, the average value increase is about $3.25 
million. 
Separately from golden parachute payments, some firms make special cash payments to 
their CEOs as part of the terms of the merger.  We find these additional payments in 74 of 272 
cases, or about 27.2 percent of the sample.  The mean CEO wealth increase from this source is 
about $1.2 million; dividing by the frequency of .272 indicates that the average special merger 
bonus equals $4.41 million.  We collect information about firms’ stated rationales for these 
additional payments to CEOs.  Twenty-eight cases purportedly represent consulting agreements, 
and 26 more payments are characterized as non-competition agreements between the CEO and 
the buyer.  An additional 11 cases represent payments made in consideration of the cancellation 
of the CEO’s employment agreement or other contract rights.  Other payouts are described as a 
“stay bonus” (5 observations), “retention bonus” (3), “special service recognition bonus,” 
“signing bonus,” and “bonus” (2 each), and “transition bonus,” “closing bonus,” and constructive 
change-in-control bonus (1 each). 
 
4.3 Comparison of CEO financial gains with earlier studies 
Our analysis of CEO financial benefits from acquisitions can be contrasted with 
information from three papers studying takeovers in earlier periods.  Cotter and Zenner’s (1994) 
study of managerial resistance to tender offers includes a subsample of 99 completed acquisitions 
in 1989-90.  Firms in their subsample are not directly comparable to ours, as they have much 
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smaller mean market cap of $663 million.  The characteristics of the acquisitions are also quite 
different, with a significant number of hostile transactions (36 percent) and much larger takeover 
premia (a mean of 65 percent).  The authors report that the top executive in these acquired 
companies obtains gains on stock and option holdings with a mean value of $14.1 million, and 
golden parachute payments with a mean of $0.9 million, numbers that are quite close to our 
results.  While these CEOs run smaller firms, they own significantly more stock (a mean of 7.5 
percent of shares outstanding) than our sample CEOs; this ownership level combined with the 
larger premia received make their financial gains comparable to those in our study.  Cotter and 
Zenner’s executives earn mean cash compensation of $496,000 annually, meaning that their 
merger gains are approximately 30 times annual pay, a larger multiple than found for our CEOs. 
Walkling and Long (1984) also study managerial resistance in a sample of 95 tender 
offers between 1972-77.  Unfortunately, their paper does not disaggregate managerial wealth 
effects based upon the success of the offers, but their earlier sample exhibits far lower financial 
gains for CEOs.  The authors find an average wealth change for the top-ranked executive from 
stock and option appreciation of $713,750 for uncontested offers and $192,000 ($161,210) for 
contested, or $505,050 for the unified sample.  This gain represents an average of 8.6 times the 
annual salary of these managers. 
Agrawal and Walkling (1994) detail severance payments for 13 target CEOs who 
appeared to leave involuntarily following a takeover bid.  For this much smaller sample, their 
average estimated payments are similar to ours, but their sample does not have large outliers 
similar to the ones we find.  They estimate an average present value for these payments of about 
$2.3 million (including parachutes, consulting contracts, etc.).  This is roughly in line with our 
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estimated average parachute of $2.7 million for those CEOs who did have a parachute in place.  
Including the average additional bonus of $1.2 million makes our estimates 70% larger than 
those of Agrawal and Walkling, but inflation over the 10-year period between samples and 
differences in approximation methods could easily account for that gap. 
 
4.4 Target CEO’s subsequent role with the buyer 
In addition to the impact of an acquisition on their personal wealth, CEOs might agree to 
the sale of their firms because of the prospect of an important position as an executive in the 
merged company. 
More than half of the target CEOs in our sample initially remain with the buyer in some 
capacity.  Panel B of Table 3 indicates that just over 50 percent of target CEOs accept jobs as 
officers of the merged firm (including non-executive chairman and vice chairman of the board), 
similar to the acquisition-related turnover data reported by Hadlock at al. (1999) and Martin and 
McConnell (1991). Additionally, 57 percent of target CEOs join the board of directors of the 
buyer.  This is notably higher than the survival of CEOs as directors documented by Harford 
(2000), who finds that 27 percent of CEOs are retained.  This may be due in part to the greater 
incidence of hostility in Harford’s sample; 26 percent of his observations are classified as hostile 
compared to the less than three percent of bids that are unsolicited in our sample.  A small 
number of the target CEOs play top leadership roles in the merged firm: nine take over the 
buyer’s CEO position, 15 serve as president and/or chief operating officer, and ten become non-
executive chairman of the board. 
Further data in Panel B indicate that target firms obtain additional governance-related 
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considerations.  Targets place a median of two directors (mean of 2.3) on the board of the buyer, 
one of whom is usually but not always the target’s CEO.  The buyer’s board is controlled one-
sixth by directors from the target subsequent to the median transaction.  In about one-seventh of 
all transactions, the buyer agrees to change the company name, generally to incorporate part of 
the target’s name. 
Table 4 presents information about the fate of CEOs who remain with the buyer.  
Compensation becomes higher for these executives, as their salaries rise by a median of 8.6 
percent (mean of 17.6 percent) and their bonuses increase by a median of 19.4 percent (mean of 
34.3 percent).  While these changes are lower than the 49.1 percent average change in salary plus 
bonus observed for target CEOs in the 1980s by Agrawal and Walkling (1994), their matching 
sample of non-target firms experienced a 44.9 percent increase.  Agrawal and Walkling also use 
a slightly longer window of time, from two years before the bid to one year after. 
Although the revisions in salary and bonus look fairly good for target CEOs, the survival 
rates for these executives are strikingly low.  We read the first proxy statement filed by the buyer 
in the aftermath of the merger to determine whether target CEOs who had taken a position in the 
merged firm are still in place.  After one year, the fraction of target CEOs serving as executives 
of the buyer drops from .503 to .349, meaning that only 67.1 percent of ex-CEOs survive their 
first year in office as an executive of the target.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents more detailed data about the survival rates of target CEOs 
who become executives of the parent.  We separate these officers into four gradations: (a) CEO, 
president, and chairman; (b) other executive officers; (c) executives in subsidiaries of the buyer 
(such as CEOs who remain as CEOs of the target once it becomes wholly owned by the buyer); 
 
 18 
and (d) vice chairman of the board, a title that usually carries little or no operating responsibility. 
 We extend our analysis by reading proxy statements filed for the three years after the 
acquisition.4  All categories of executives have extremely high departure rates.  First-year 
departure rates range from 23.1 percent for officers in the top-three category to 59.3 percent for 
vice chairmen.  After three years, 67.3 percent of top-three officers and 88.2 percent of subsidiary 
executives are gone, and departure rates are similarly high for vice chairmen and executives in 
other positions. 
Data are similar but not quite as dramatic for ex-CEOs serving on boards, as just 77.6 
percent of this group remain as directors after 1 year.  
These turnover rates far exceed those found in most studies of CEOs and corporate 
directors.  For comparison purposes, Parrino (1997) reports unconditional turnover rates for 
CEOs of 12.2 percent annually, while data in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) indicate an 
unconditional turnover rate for directors of about 9 percent annually.  Our results are more in line 
with Gilson’s (1990) presentation of very low survival rates for officers and directors in 
financially distressed firms. 
Some of the ex-CEOs who do not survive as executives of the buyer collect substantial 
severance packages (these do not enter into our calculation of merger-related wealth changes 
discussed above).  Of the 146 ex-CEOs whom we identify as becoming executives of the buyer, 
48 are no longer listed as executives in the first proxy statement filed after the transaction.  Of 
these 48, 37 collect severance payments with a median value of $1.5 million, mean of $3.77 
                                                 
4 A certain number of companies disappear from our analysis  because the buyer itself is acquired by a third 
firm. 
 
 19 
million, and maximum of $30 million. 
One reason for the high turnover rates of target CEOs after they join the buyer is that 
some of their appointments are made with pre-specified limited time horizons.  We find 18 such 
cases out of the 146 CEOs who become executives of the buyer, a rate of about 12 percent.  The 
life of these agreements range from a few months (until the next annual meeting) to five years. 
We find that some target CEOs negotiate explicit succession agreements to secure their 
positions in the new firm, but these agreements are generally not honored.  In four cases, the 
target CEO becomes the CEO of the buyer but is required to surrender the job within a specified 
period; in three additional cases, the target CEO becomes chairman and chief operating officer of 
the buyer, with the stipulation that he will ascend to the CEO position within a certain period.  In 
only one instance of these seven (the merger of Nynex and Bell Atlantic) did the CEO position 
ultimately change hands as called for in the original agreement.  In two further cases the 
agreement arguably became moot, as one controversial CEO was prevented by government utility 
regulators from taking office, and another negotiated the sale of the firm before the date at which 
he was due to step down. 
 
4.5 Regression analysis 
When CEOs bargain with the acquiror over acquisition terms that affect them personally, 
we conjecture that they engage in tradeoffs between cash payments, their position in the merged 
company, board seats, and other personal benefits.  We expect that these tradeoffs are influenced 
by personal characteristics of CEOs, especially age (a proxy for the time left until expected 
retirement) and the extent to which they dominate the corporate governance of the target firm. 
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A second set of more nefarious tradeoffs may also exist.  Target CEOs might be expected 
to sell the firm at an attractive price if their personal benefits from the transaction are large.  
Since a low takeover premium for target shareholders would also depress the CEO’s own stock 
and option appreciation, we might expect CEOs to accept lower takeover premia only if they 
receive prominent jobs in the management of the buyer or special compensation arrangements 
not directly related to equity value. 
We conduct regression analysis in an attempt to illuminate the relative magnitude of some 
of these tradeoffs.  Our regressions test several hypotheses about patterns in which we expect 
CEOs to seek to extract private benefits from the buyer: 
1. CEOs who do not become officers of the acquiror should obtain greater monetary 
gains from the acquisition, since they effectively surrender the permanent income 
stream associated with their former positions. 
 
2. CEO financial gains should be inversely related to the prominence of the CEO’s 
new position in the buyer, if any. 
 
3. Older CEOs should extract lower monetary benefits, since the present value of the 
lifetime income stream they surrender is lower. 
 
4. CEOs with greater bargaining power should obtain greater personal benefits.  We 
measure bargaining power in two ways: (i) the ratio of the market capitalization of 
the target relative to that of the buyer; and (ii) the percentage equity ownership of 
the target CEO in his own firm. 
 
5. CEOs who do become top officers of the acquiror or receive other forms of 
favorable treatment should be expected to agree to transactions with lower prices 
paid to target shareholders. 
 
 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present results of OLS regressions that test these hypotheses.  In Table 
5, the dependent variable for the model in the first column equals the total monetary gains from 
all sources, including stock and option appreciation, golden parachutes, augmented parachutes, 
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and additional deal bonuses.  Explanatory variables include dummy variables for whether the 
CEO becomes an officer or director of the target, CEO age, the market capitalization of the 
target, the ratio between the target’s and buyer’s market caps, and the percentage ownership of 
the target CEO.  The right column shows the same model, but with the dependent variable equal 
to direct cash payments to the CEO, excluding stock and option appreciation.  We find evidence 
that the CEO’s total monetary gains are lower when he becomes an officer of the target, with an 
estimate of -$4.3 million that is significant at the 5 percent level.  However, the estimate falls to -
$1.1 million and loses significance when the dependent variable is restricted to cash 
compensation only. 
In Table 6, we repeat the analysis from Table 5 but replace the officer dummy variable 
with four dummies indicating different levels of responsibility: (i) the CEO takes a “top three” 
post of CEO, president, or chairman; (ii) the CEO takes another executive position in top 
management, such as executive or senior vice president; (iii) the CEO becomes vice chairman of 
the board with no direct management responsibility; and (iv) the CEO becomes an officer of a 
division of the buyer (usually his old firm, which becomes a wholly owned subsidiary).  The 
coefficient estimates on these dummy variables are rank-ordered in an intuitive way.  CEOs who 
move into top positions in the buyer appear to forego the largest financial gains from the merger 
transaction, a result that makes sense since one expects them to earn the greatest future 
compensation from their new posts.  Other executive officers sacrifice the second-most pay, 
followed by vice chairmen and subsidiary officers. 
Our regression estimates of an inverse association between monetary gains and post-
merger executive positions do not extend to directorships.  Results in Table 5 indicate a weakly 
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positive but insignificant association between target CEOs’ financial gains and a dummy variable 
for whether they join the board of directors of the buyer. 
We do not find the expected relation between CEO age and monetary benefits.  In every 
specification of both tables, we estimate a positive and significant coefficient on the age variable, 
indicating the older CEOs extract greater financial gains from the merger transaction.  Although 
older CEOs are sacrificing less future income by selling their firms, one might understand the 
regression estimates in several ways.  Older CEOs might have greater tenure and influence over 
corporate governance, meaning that the age variable serves as a proxy for bargaining power.  
Older CEOs might also have accumulated more stock and options in their firms. 
Further indications of CEO bargaining power have coefficient estimates clearly in line 
with our hypotheses.  CEOs who own more stock, and CEOs from firms whose relative size is 
closer to the size of the buyer both succeed in extracting greater financial gains, according to 
estimates in both models, although the CEO stock ownership result loses significance in the 
model shown in the right column. 
Table 7 explores the relation between personal benefits received by target CEOs and the 
acquisition premia paid to their shareholders.  We focus on benefits indicating extraordinary 
treatment of the CEO, and we deliberately omit appreciation of the CEO’s stock and option 
holdings, since these gains will exhibit a lock-step positive association with the premium paid to 
all shareholders.  Our main independent variables, used in the model in the first column of Table 
7, are dummy variables for (i) whether the CEO’s golden parachute is augmented at the time of 
the transaction; (ii) whether the CEO received additional merger-related payments such as 
consulting contracts or special bonuses; (iii) - (vi) four dummies indicating the level of executive 
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position, if any, obtained by the CEO in the buyer; and (vii) whether the CEO joins the board of 
directors of the buyer. 
As shown in the first column of Table 7, all seven of the dummy variables for CEO 
personal benefits have negative coefficient estimates, though all of these estimates are 
insignificant.  The negative coefficients are consistent with a conjecture that CEOs negotiate less 
favorable acquisition terms for their own shareholders when the transaction includes special 
treatment of the CEO.  In the center column of Table 7, we estimate the same model but add 
together the seven dummy variables.  The coefficient on the sum of these dummies – equivalent 
to an F-based hypothesis test of whether their sum is significantly different from zero – has a 
negative estimate, significant at the 10 percent level.  Finally, in the right column of Table 7, we 
repeat this analysis but restrict ourselves to the subsample of CEOs who own less than the 
median amount of equity ($12.15 million) in their firms.  We expect this group to be more 
predisposed in merger negotiations to trade off equity appreciation for personal benefits, since 
they stand to lose less financially than CEOs with greater ownership.  With the regression limited 
to this subsample, the coefficient estimate for the sum of the seven dummy variables grows in 
magnitude by about 50 percent and becomes significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We study the private benefits obtained by target company CEOs in successful merger and 
acquisition transactions.  Our research is motivated by frequent news reports of large agency 
conflicts in M&A bargaining situations. 
The magnitude of the CEO wealth increases that we document appear roughly in line with 
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the permanent income streams that they sacrifice by selling their firms.  We find that target CEOs 
obtain wealth increases with a median of $4 to $5 million and a mean of $8 to $11 million.  
These financial benefits arise mostly from stock and option appreciation, though a majority of 
CEOs also receive substantial golden parachute payments.  Some CEOs receive last-minute 
financial benefits when their boards of directors vote to approve mergers, as 12 percent have their 
golden parachutes increased and 28 percent receive a variety of additional cash bonuses.  The 
extra payments, when made, typically add millions of dollars to the CEO’s merger gains. 
Regression analysis indicates an inverse association between the CEO’s monetary 
benefits and their new status (if any) in the merged firm.  About half of the target CEOs in our 
sample become officers of the buyer, with a handful ascending into top management positions.  
While these executives receive higher compensation than before, we find that their new positions 
are hazardous, with extremely high departure rates in the three years following completion of the 
transaction.  A large majority of those executives who do lose their new jobs are compensated 
through large severance payments. 
We explore whether CEOs compromise the interests of their shareholders in those 
transactions in which they receive extraordinary personal benefits.  Regression results provide 
some evidence of an inverse association between selling shareholder premia and such CEO 
benefits as positions in the buyer and unusual financial bonuses awarded at the time of the 
transaction. 
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Table1
C haracteristicsofC EO sofacquiredcom panies
D escriptivestatisticsabouttheownership, com pensation, andothercharacteristicsofC EO s
ofacquired com panies. T he sam ple includes311large ¯rm sacquired between 1995and
1997.Inform ation isobtainedfrom proxy statem ents¯ledduring thelastyearpriorto the
transaction.T hedum my variablesforseparatechairm an andseparatepresidentequalone
ifa person otherthan the C EO servesin thesepositions.
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 0.036 0.008 0.506 285
C EO totaloptions/sharesoutstanding 0.016 0.011 0.211 285
C EO salary priorto acquisition 423,322 351,489 2,493,795 289
C EO bonuspriorto acquisition 374,559 170,000 5,965,313 289
C EO age 53.886 54.000 74.000 290
C EO tenurelessthan 5yearsdum my 0.496 0.000 1.000 290
Separatepresidentdum m y 0.285 0.000 1.000 298
Separatechairm an dum m y 0.305 0.000 1.000 298
Table2
Transaction characteristics
D escriptive statisticsabout the acquisitionsof311 large ¯rm sbetween 1995 and 1997.
Inform ation isobtainedfrom databasesm aintainedby SecuritiesD ata C orporation andthe
C enterforR esearch in SecuritiesPrices.T he value oftargetandbuyer¯rm sism easured
onem onth priortothedateofthe¯rsto®er.T heprem ium receivedby targetshareholders
iscalculated relative to the transaction announcem entdate. SD C prem ium calculations
assum e that the transaction iscompleted according to termsannounced in the m erger
agreem ent.C R SP prem ium calculationsarebasedon actualm arketpricesofthe target's
stock.
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
Targetvaluepriorto theo®er(000) 1,267,330 385,680 21,445,802 309
B uyervaluepriorto theo®er(000) 3,344,627 1,279,235 51,196,340 309
Targetvalue/buyervalue 0.442 0.317 3.020 309
U nsoliciteddum m y 0.026 0.000 1.000 309
Totalprem ium fourweeks, SD C data 0.348 0.304 1.259 308
Stock return, two days, C R SPdata 0.155 0.137 0.854 309
Stock return, 20days, C R SPdata 0.227 0.211 1.412 309
Table3
G ainsreceivedby targetC EO s
W ealth increasesandgovernanceconsiderationsobtainedby theC EO softarget¯rm s.T he
sam ple includes311large ¯rm sacquiredbetween 1995and1997.Inform ation isobtained
from Form S-4orsim ilardocum ents¯led with the SEC at the tim e ofthe acquisition.
G ainsin the value of C EO stock holdingsare com puted using four-week prem ium sas
m easuredby both the SD C and C R SP databases. O ption gainsare calculated sim ilarly
using an assum ption that alloptionsare at- orin-the-m oney priorto the transaction.
G olden parachutepaym entsarecalculatedbasedon inform ation from thetargetcom pany's
lastproxystatem ent¯ledpriortothetransaction.A ugm entedparachutesanddealbonuses
representadditionalpaym entsawardedto C EO satthetim eofthe acquisition.
PanelA :M onetary gains
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
Stock gains
Sharegains(use20day C R SPreturn) 4,247,863 1,338,146 129,100,000 290
O ption gains(use20C R SPreturn) 656,451 229,908 8,267,318 283
C ash com pensation
Parachute 1,465,251 900,000 24,976,764 277
A ugm entation ofparachute 393,545 0 36,944,986 272
A dditionalbonus 1,201,011 0 60,000,000 272
Parachutedum m y 0.690 1.000 1.000 277
A ugm entation ofparachutedum m y 0.121 0.000 1.000 272
A dditionalbonusdum m y 0.279 0.000 1.000 272
Totalgains
Totalgains(20day C R SPstock return) 8,117,406 3,830,462 132,360,000 243
Totalgains(fourweek SD C prem ium ) 11,767,526 5,320,657 217,750,000 242
Totalgains/Salary+bonus(20day return) 10.175 6.440 118.200 242
Totalgains/Salary+bonus(fourweek prem ium ) 15.956 8.789 200.370 241
PanelB :O thergains
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
C EO rem ainsaso± cer 0.503 1.000 1.000 290
C EO rem ainsasdirector 0.571 1.000 1.000 289
N umberoftargetm emberson new board 2.314 2.000 15.000 287
Targetboardm embers/new buyerboardsize 0.176 0.167 0.545 285
B uyerchangesnam e 0.147 0.000 1.000 279
Table4
StatusoftargetC EO swhobecom eo± cersanddirectorsofthebuyer
C om pensation and subsequent em ploym ent statusof C EO sof target ¯rm swho accept
positionswith the acquiror.T he sam ple includes311large ¯rmsacquiredbetween 1995
and1997.Inform ation isobtainedfrom Proxy Statem ents¯ledwith theSEC forthethree
yearsfollowing theacquisition.
PanelA :C EO status
V ariable M ean M ed M ax O bs
C EO rem ainsaso± cerafter1year 0.349 0.000 1.000 281
Frequency ofC EO surviving 1yearaso± cer 0.671 1.000 1.000 167
C EO rem ainsasdirectorafter1year 0.451 0.000 1.000 293
Frequency ofC EO surviving 1yearasdirector 0.776 1.000 1.000 165
C hange in C EO salary 1.176 1.086 6.752 98
C hange in C EO bonus 1.343 1.194 4.982 83
C EO receiving severance in year1dum my 0.132 0.000 1.000 281
Severancepaidin year1 3,770,864 1,500,000 30,000,000 37
PanelB :D eparturerateby C EO new position atnew ¯rm
C um ulativedeparturerateoftargetC EO
N ew position afterthem erger O neyear T wo years T hreeyears O bs
C EO , President, C hairm an 0.231 0.495 0.673 52
O therexecutiveo± cer 0.333 0.500 0.700 21
Executive in a subsidiary 0.283 0.686 0.882 46
V icechairm an 0.593 0.715 0.857 27
Table5
C EO m onetary gainsando®ercharacteristics
O rdinary leastsquaresestim atesofm onetary gainsobtainedby C EO sin a sample of311
large ¯rm sacquiredbetween 1995and 1997.T he dependentvariable in the left colum n
includesgainsfrom equity appreciation, option appreciation, golden parachutes, augm ented
parachutes, and additionalm erger-related bonuses. T he dependent variable in the right
colum n includesgainsfrom parachutesand bonusesonly. T he m arket capitalization of
targetandbuyer¯rm sism easuredone m onth priorto the ¯rsto®erm ade by the buyer.
D ata isobtainedfrom Proxy Statem ents, Form sS-4, andsim ilarSEC ¯lings.
M ergergains, total M ergergains, cash
Intercept -22,553,581a -4,791,037
(3.13) (1.38)
TargetC EO rem ainsasan o± cer -4,307,095b -1,194,799
(2.04) (1.18)
TargetC EO rem ainsasdirector 1,671,447 479,463
(0.78) (0.47)
C EO age 471,392a 112,496c
(3.69) (1.83)
Targetvaluepriorto acquisition 3,709,726 1,910,636
(1.45) (1.55)
Targetvalue/buyervalue 1.81a 0.96a
(5.37) (5.91)
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 71,889,874a 2,830,192
(5.73) (0.47)
O bservations 239 239
A djR 2 0.251 0.161
a,b,cdenotessigni¯cantly di®erentfrom zero atthe1, 5, and10percentlevels.
Table6
C EO m onetary gains
O rdinary leastsquaresestim atesofm onetary gainsobtainedby C EO sin a sample of311
large ¯rm sacquiredbetween 1995and 1997.T he dependentvariable in the left colum n
includesgainsfrom equity appreciation, option appreciation, golden parachutes, augm ented
parachutes, and additionalm erger-related bonuses. T he dependent variable in the right
colum n includesgainsfrom parachutesand bonusesonly. T he m arket capitalization of
targetandbuyer¯rm sism easuredone m onth priorto the ¯rsto®erm ade by the buyer.
D ata isobtainedfrom Proxy Statem ents, Form sS-4, andsim ilarSEC ¯lings.
M ergergains, total M ergergains, cash
Intercept -21,736,625a -4,549,732
(2.97) (1.30)
TargetC EO rem ainsin top3position -5,255,090b -2,315,530c
(2.07) (1.91)
TargetC EO rem ainsexecutiveo± cer -5,076,593 -1,334,105
(1.51) (0.83)
TargetC EO rem ainsasvicechairm an -2,543,589 741,682
(0.76) (0.46)
TargetC EO rem ainsaso± cerofsubsidiary -1,819,060 -336,339
(0.74) (0.29)
C EO age 460,970a 107,406c
(3.55) (1.73)
Targetvaluepriorto acquisition 4,377,523c 2,325,385c
(1.70) (1.89)
Targetvalue/buyervalue 1.90a 0.99a
(5.46) (5.99)
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 70,569,716a 2,292,804
(5.62) (0.38)
O bservations 241 241
A djR 2 0.243 0.166
a,b,cdenotessigni¯cantly di®erentfrom zero atthe1, 5, and10percentlevels.
Table7
Tradeo® between C EO gainsandshareholdersprem uim
O rdinary leastsquaresestim atesofshareholder'sstock premuim in a sample of311large
¯rm sacquiredbetween1995and1997.T hedependentvariableisequalsthereturn totarget
shareholdersoverthe20-dayperioduptoandincludingtheacquisition announcem entdate.
R egressionsin the leftandm iddlecolum nsincludesthen entiresam ple.R egression in the
rightcolum nsinclude the subsam ple where the totalvalue ofsharesandoptionsheldby
the C EO isbelow thesamplem edian $12.15m illion.
Targetreturn, 20days
Fullsam ple L ow C EO holdings
Intercept 0.0173 -0.0130 -0.0438
(0.15) (0.12) (0.29)
Sum ofallC EO bene¯ tdum m ies -0.0248c -0.0365b
(1.77) (2.12)
A ugm entation ofparachutedum m y -0.0394
(0.94)
A dditionalbonusdum m y -0.0241
(0.79)
TargetC EO rem ainsin top3position -0.0155
(0.35)
TargetC EO rem ainsexecutiveo± cer -0.0710
(1.28)
TargetC EO rem ainsasvicechairm an -0.0088
(0.16)
TargetC EO rem ainsaso± cerofsubsidiary -0.0223
(0.58)
TargetC EO rem ainsasdirector -0.0259
(0.76)
C EO age 0.0051a 0.0056a 0.0072a
(2.58) (2.94) (2.84)
Targetvalue/buyervalue -0.0766c -0.0747b -0.0851
(1.95) (2.02) (1.60)
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 0.1191 0.1320 -1.1771
(0.61) (0.69) (1.04)
C EO (shares+options)*price(m ilions) -0.0003c -0.0003c -0.0002
(1.95) (1.95) (0.04)
U nsoliciteddum m y 0.1123 0.1215 0.1112
(1.25) (1.38) (1.13)
O bservations 252 252 126
A djR 2 0.043 0.062 0.090
a,b,cdenotessigni¯cantly di®erentfrom zero atthe1, 5, and10percentlevels.
